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INTRODUCTION
Evidence derived from classified national-security information 
has long been a part of court proceedings in the United States.1 Despite 
the longstanding nature of its use, it can pose constitutional issues. The 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . .”2 The Supreme Court’s post-
Crawford v. Washington3 interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 
including its most recent clarification in Ohio v. Clark,4 presents a 
theoretical obstacle to introducing such evidence in criminal trials. 
Before Crawford, prosecutors were required to show only “indicia of 
reliability” to support the introduction of evidence over a 
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1. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-442, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (stating that the Supreme Court first
addressed the use of the state secrets privilege—which allows the Federal Government to prevent 
the disclosure of information which would be harmful to the United States—in United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)); Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1962, 1962 (2005) (“[T]he United States has long used [classified] evidence in criminal 
prosecutions, military courts-martial and various immigration proceedings.”). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
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Confrontation Clause challenge.5 Crawford and its progeny require the 
district court to examine whether the out-of-court declarant intended 
his or her statement to be used in a later prosecution, a far stricter 
standard.6 Clark extends Confrontation Clause protection to 
statements made by out-of-court declarants to non-law enforcement 
persons, such as members of the intelligence community.7 The 
expansion in Clark suggests it is time to reevaluate the constitutionality 
of the introduction of some classified evidence during a criminal trial. 
Although Clark may, in certain scenarios, present a bar to the 
government’s introduction of statements collected by U.S. intelligence 
agencies, it is unlikely to pose a significant hurdle. The Confrontation 
Clause, under current jurisprudence, only classifies as prohibited 
“testimonial” statements those that are made with the primary purpose 
of creating evidence for a later criminal trial.8 Despite the theoretical 
possibility that Clark could bar the introduction of intelligence-agency-
collected evidence, it is unlikely to do so in practice. Because many 
statements collected by our intelligence agencies—such as those 
intercepted electronically from phone calls, emails, or text messages, 
or those gathered from foreign agents—were not intended by the 
declarant to be used in a trial, or were collected without the declarant’s 
knowledge, Clark’s holding is unlikely to be a burden on the use of 
classified information derived from foreign intelligence. 
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the use of 
classified information during criminal trials, and the Classified 
Information Procedure Act’s (CIPA) mechanics and constitutionality. 
Part II elaborates on the Court’s exposition of the Confrontation 
Clause, including its latest pronouncements in Clark. Part III examines 
how the post-Clark Confrontation Clause doctrine might affect the use 
of foreign-intelligence information in criminal prosecutions, focusing 
specifically on the use of signals and human intelligence.9 It argues that, 
 
 5. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth 
Amendment demands . . . unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”). 
 7. Clark, 125 S. Ct. at 2181–82. 
 8. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (describing the “primary purpose” test). 
 9. Other authors have examined issues related to the Confrontation Clause and classified 
evidence, but those studies were conducted before the Court’s decision in Clark. See, e.g., Brian 
McEvoy, Note, Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: Correcting a Misapplication of 
the Classified Information Procedures Act, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 395, 395 (2005); John Scott, 
Comment, “Confronting” Foreign Intelligence: Crawford Roadblocks to Domestic Terrorism 
Trials, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1039, 1039 (2011). Because of the decision’s doctrinal 
significance, it is necessary to reevaluate the use of classified information after Clark. The 
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with one small exception, foreign-intelligence information should be 
admissible over a Confrontation Clause objection because speakers 
either did not or could not have intended that their statements be used 
for later prosecution. 
I.  USING CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE IN A TRIAL 
The nondisclosure of certain sensitive information by the 
government during a criminal trial has long been a part of the judicial 
process in the United States. In Rovario v. United States,10 the Court 
addressed the government’s right to withhold the identity of an 
informant from the defendant.11 The Court called for a balance 
between the public’s interest in keeping the informant’s identity a 
secret with the defendant’s right to fully defend herself.12 A lower court 
assessing this balance was required to look at “the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime 
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the 
informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”13 If the informer 
provides information “crucial to the defense,” then the government 
must either allow the defense to cross-examine the informant or 
dismiss the charges.14 
The Rovario line of cases15 gave rise to “greymail”—“the dilemma 
facing the Government when a defendant claims that he must use 
 
inclusion of classified evidence in criminal trials has also been questioned on due process grounds. 
See Note, supra note 1, at 1982.  
 10. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).  
 11. Id. at 62. The Court noted that if the informant was known to the defendant, or had died 
prior to trial, the privilege would have ended because its purpose was to “shield[] the identity of 
an informer from those who would have cause to resent his conduct.” Id. at 60 n.8.  
 12. Id. at 62. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 600 (1974). 
 15. The Court has announced varying standards of materiality required to overcome the 
government’s privilege. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 870 (1982) (stating 
Rovario’s holding as requiring that a court conclude the “informer’s testimony would be highly 
relevant” (emphasis added)); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 600 (requiring the information be “crucial to the 
defense” (emphasis added)); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972) (recognizing that an 
informer’s “identity cannot be concealed from the defendant when it is critical to his case” 
(emphasis added)); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 646 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“The prosecution often dislikes to make public the identity of the informer on whose information 
its case rests. But his identity must be disclosed where his testimony is material to the trial.” 
(emphasis added)); Rovario, 353 U.S. at 60–61 (“Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, 
or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is 
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” (emphasis added)). 
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classified information in defending himself.”16 The government is 
forced to choose between continuing to prosecute, “thereby 
compromising the classified material, or safeguarding the material but 
dropping the prosecution.”17 Generally, the defendant would attempt 
greymail through a “vague, non-specific[] threat.”18 The government’s 
reluctance to reveal classified information led many to worry that 
defendants would imperil valid prosecutions even in situations where 
the prosecutor could conduct the case within the bounds of due 
process.19 Then-Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff Scooter 
Libby, who was prosecuted for leaking classified information, and 
Oliver North, a National Security Council staffer who was prosecuted 
for his involvement with the Iran-Contra scandal, were accused of 
using greymail to prevent the government from following through with 
their cases.20 
In an attempt to limit the greymail problem21 and “strik[e] a 
balance” between the government’s interest in keeping classified 
information secret, and a defendant’s right to confront the evidence 
against herself,22 Congress passed CIPA in 1980, which set out 
procedures for the use of classified evidence in criminal prosecutions.23 
In doing so, it aimed “to provide Federal courts with clear statutory 
guidance on handling secret evidence in criminal cases.”24 CIPA 
enables a district court judge to determine whether the government 
must give the defendant classified information that it seeks to use 
 
 16. See Graymail Legislation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 1 (1979) (statement of Rep. Murphy). 
 17. Id. 
 18. United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983).  
 19. Id. at 1197. 
 20. See Request for ‘Greymail’ May Doom Libby Prosecution, INSIDE BAY AREA (Feb. 25, 
2006), http://www.insidebayarea.com/dailyreview/localnews/ci_3546439 [https://perma.cc/GR4A-
C54D] (describing defendant I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s request for the disclosure of 277 highly 
classified documents as greymail); Philip A. Lacovara, Graymail, Secrets and the North Trial: Law 
on Classified Data Makes Vast Difficulty for All Parties, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1989) (suggesting that 
Oliver North’s attempt to introduce 30,000 classified documents during his defense was greymail). 
It should be noted that both of these cases of greymail occurred after the passage of CIPA.  
 21. See S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 2 (1980) (stating that CIPA was introduced to “minimize the 
problem of so-called graymail . . . by requiring a ruling on the admissibility of . . . classified 
information before trial”). 
 22. Arjun Chadran, Note, The Classified Information Procedures Act in the Age of 
Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-Specific Manner, 64 DUKE. L.J. 1411, 1412 (2015); 
see, e.g., McEvoy, supra note 9, at 395.  
 23. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 202 (1980) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2012)). 
 24. S. REP. NO. 110-442, pt. 1, at 9 (2008). 
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during trial.25 Upon motion, the government can ask the court for an in 
camera hearing to determine whether classified information must be 
disclosed to the defendant.26 The court is allowed to “consider any 
matters which relate to classified information or which may promote a 
fair and expeditious trial,”27 and may issue a protective order 
disallowing the disclosure of classified information,28 or allow the 
government to redact specific items of classified information from the 
discovery materials provided to the defendant.29 If the court requires 
the government to disclose classified information, the prosecution can 
move to provide a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified 
information would prove in lieu of revealing the classified material 
itself.30 
So the government can properly evaluate classified information 
before its disclosure in open court, CIPA section 5(a) requires that a 
defendant provide notice to the government of her intent to disclose 
classified information.31 Failure by the defendant to provide such 
notice may preclude disclosure of the information or examination of 
the witness.32 If the government objects to disclosure allowed by the 
court, the court must dismiss the indictment or information, unless “the 
interests of justice would not be served by dismissal.”33 The court may, 
however, order other appropriate action instead of dismissing the 
action.34 
CIPA specifically protects the examination of a witness who might 
reveal classified information during examination by the defendant.35 
Section 8(c) allows the government to object to any line of questioning 
 
 25. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (2012). 
 26. Id. § 6(a). 
 27. Id. § 2.  
 28. Id. § 3.  
 29. Id. § 4.  
 30. Id. § 6(c)(1). The court must find that the subsitution “will provide the defendant with 
substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified 
information.” Id. 
 31. Id. § 5(a); see also United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(describing the intent of § 5(a) to provide both the government and the court prior notice of any 
classified information to be introduced by the defense). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(b). 
 33. Id. § 6(e)(2). This determination is made by the district court. 
 34. Id. Alternatives to dismissal include ruling that the classified information is immaterial, 
allowing a substitution of a summary of the classified information, or allowing the government to 
admit the facts that the defendant wants to prove by the use of classified information. Id. 
 35. See id. § 8(c). 
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that “may require the witness to disclose classified information not 
previously found to be admissible.”36 After such an objection, the court 
is required to determine if the response by the witness will disclose 
classified information.37 
CIPA has withstood constitutional challenge.38 In United States v. 
Wilson,39 the Second Circuit upheld CIPA’s notice provision as applied 
to a defendant who was barred from testifying about the classified 
details of his work.40 The defendant wanted to testify in the district 
court that the activities for which he was being prosecuted were part of 
his work for U.S. intelligence.41 The district court, relying on CIPA, 
would allow testimony regarding Wilson’s employment by intelligence 
agencies and involvement in covert operations, but it would not allow 
that testimony to include details of any operations.42 The Second 
Circuit found this situation to be exactly what Congress intended CIPA 
to cover.43 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the use of CIPA’s 
notice provision in a prosecution for fraud on the Armed Forces 
against a defendant who wished to reveal details of classified military 
intelligence operations.44 
United States v. Jolliff45 involved a challenge to the notice 
provision based on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.46 The defendant asserted that the notice provision 
required him to reveal classified information to individuals who were 
not cleared to know such information—namely, the judge and defense 
counsel—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 798, which criminalizes such 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 32 (D.D.C. 1989) (“[E]very court that 
has passed on the constitutionality of CIPA has upheld it.”). 
 39. United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 40. Id. at 9. 
 41. Id. at 8–9. 
 42. Id. at 9.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1200 (11th Cir. 1983). The Collins court was 
primarily concerned with the vagueness of defendant’s CIPA notice. Id. at 1198–99. The court 
considered the defendant’s failure to provide details regarding what classified information was 
going to be disclosed as improper. Id. at 1199. The court stated that allowing a vague § 5(a) notice 
by a defendant would “merely require the defendant to reduce ‘greymail’ to writing,” because the 
government would not be able to evaluate the potential damage to national security without 
detail. Id. at 1200.  
 45. United States v. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 229 (D. Md. 1981). 
 46. Id. at 231. 
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disclosure.47 The court found that because the judge did not require a 
security clearance to view the classified information,48 and because the 
government had offered to provide the defendant’s attorney a 
sufficient security clearance, there was no Fifth Amendment 
violation.49 
Another challenge to CIPA involved former National Security 
Advisor John Poindexter, who was prosecuted for his involvement in 
the Iran-Contra scandal.50 Poindexter, like those mentioned 
previously, challenged CIPA’s notice provision as a violation of his 
Fifth Amendment rights.51 He also challenged it for violating his rights 
to counsel, due process, and to confront the witnesses against him.52 
None of these challenges succeeded.53 The court dismissed 
Poindexter’s Confrontation Clause challenge, which was based on 
CIPA’s requirement that Poindexter notify the prosecution of his 
intention to elicit classified information from prosecution witnesses on 
cross-examination.54 In rejecting this challenge, the court stated that 
the Confrontation Clause provided Poindexter “an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”55 
A more contemporary case, decided after Crawford but before 
Clark, also addressed the Sixth Amendment issues raised by using 
classified evidence. In In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in 
 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012); Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. at 231. 
 48. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. at 231 (“Section 4 of the Security Procedures Established Pursuant 
to Public Law 96–456, 94 Stat. 2025, by the Chief Justice of the United States provides that no 
security clearances are required for judges.”).  
 49. Id. 
 50. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 33–35 (D.D.C. 1989). For information 
regarding the Iran-Contra scandal itself, see generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); The 
Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Nov. 24, 2006), http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210 [https://perma.cc/3S7Z-Z6F2] (providing declassified 
documents relating to the scandal). 
 51. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 33–35. 
 52. See id. at 31 (“According to defendant, [CIPA] violates his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent; his . . . rights to testify in his own defense; his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel; his right to cross examine witnesses against him; and his right to 
due process of law.”). 
 53. See id. at 33–35 (rejecting the basis for Poindexter’s constitutional complaints).  
 54. Id. at 34. 
 55. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). 
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East Africa,56 the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense57 was not violated even though 
the defendant himself was not allowed to review the classified 
information presented by the government.58 In doing so, the court did 
not address any of the then-recent Confrontation Clause cases. Instead, 
the court relied on Chambers v. Mississippi,59 a case from 1973, for the 
proposition that “a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine the 
witnesses in his case ‘is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow 
to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial 
process.’”60 
CIPA’s passage provided courts an avenue for addressing the 
issues caused by greymail, and created a process for introducing 
classified information in criminal proceedings. Classified information 
can only be introduced at trial if it complies with Constitutional 
requirements, including the Confrontation Clause.61 As will be 
discussed below, the Confrontation Clause’s interpretation changed 
significantly in the wake of the Court’s decision in Crawford, requiring 
a reevaluation of exactly what limits remain on the introduction of 
classified evidence. 
II.  THE CHANGING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause doctrine has seen 
a radical shift in the last dozen years. The Confrontation Clause 
requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”62 Generally, 
 
 56. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam). 
 57. Although the defendant challenged the government’s introduction of evidence on the 
basis of the Confrontation Clause, because the government had sought to introduce documents, 
not testimony, the court reframed the Confrontation Clause challenge as a Sixth Amendment 
challenge for deprivation “of his right to present a defense.” Id. at 123 n.27. 
 58. Id. at 127. The court also upheld a district court requirement that all persons wanting 
access to classified information were required to hold a security clearance, including defense 
counsel. Id. at 122. This requirement was constitutional “as long as the application . . . does not 
deprive the defense of evidence that would be ‘useful to counter the government’s case or to 
bolster a defense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 59. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 60. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 127 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295). 
 61. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 255 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
government . . . may either declassify the document, seek approval of an effective substitute, or 
forego its use altogether. . . . [H]id[ing] the evidence from the defendant, but giv[ing] it to the 
jury . . . . plainly violates the Confrontation Clause.”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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hearsay evidence—an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted—is not admissible.63 Hearsay statements can be 
admitted, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, if they exhibit 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.64 Before Crawford, 
courts were required to look for similar “indicia of reliability” when 
deciding whether an out-of-court statement was allowed over a 
Confrontation Clause objection.65 As long as the declarant was 
unavailable and the statement was trustworthy, there was no 
Confrontation Clause bar to the introduction of hearsay testimony.66 
Crawford signaled a major change in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia—seeking to bring 
the “application of the Confrontation Clause back to its original 
meaning”67—found that any time “testimonial” evidence is presented, 
the Sixth Amendment requires that the defendant have an opportunity 
to cross-examine either at trial, or before trial if the declarant is both 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.68 He explained: 
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history 
underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an 
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court 
statement.69 
Crawford generally left the definition of “testimonial statements” for 
later cases, but did enumerate a few types of covered statements: those 
taken by police in an interrogation, statements before a grand jury, and 
those made in court by a witness.70 
 
 63. FED. R. EVID. 801–02. 
 64. See id. 803–07 (such as when the declarant has a particularly strong motive to tell the 
truth or the circumstances of the statement would make falsehoods easy to discover). 
 65. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (allowing admission of statements falling 
within strong hearsay exceptions for trustworthiness). 
 66. See id. (“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his 
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”). 
 67. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining 
the Court’s opinion in Crawford, which he authored). 
 68. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 69. Id. at 51. 
 70. Id. at 68. 
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Later cases expanded the definition of “testimonial statements.” 
Davis v. Washington71 established that statements are testimonial 
where the primary purpose of the statement is to establish or prove 
past events for criminal prosecution.72 In that case, statements made to 
police during an emergency were not considered testimonial because 
“the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”73 Michigan v. Bryant74 
requires that courts “objectively evaluate the circumstances in which 
the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.”75 
In doing so, a court must evaluate the conduct of both the declarant 
and the interrogator76 to determine whether the primary purpose of a 
statement was to “creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.”77 The Court has identified, however, that statements made 
during an emergency to “seek or render aid”78 are not testimonial.79 
This primary-purpose test was underscored in both Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts80 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,81 which dealt 
with the introduction of laboratory reports as evidence during trial. In 
Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that a forensic laboratory report which 
was “created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding”82 constituted testimonial evidence, requiring that the 
defendant be able to cross-examine the laboratory analysts either at or 
before trial.83 The prosecution was not allowed to introduce the report 
without also producing a witness who could testify to the truth of the 
information in it.84 The case left open the question of whether someone 
who was familiar with the testing procedures could testify as to the 
 
 71. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
 72. Id. at 822.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).  
 75. Id. at 359.  
 76. Id. at 367.  
 77. Id. at 358. 
 78. Anne R. Traum, Confrontation After Ohio v. Clark, NEV. LAW., Oct. 2015 at 17, 19.  
 79. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377–78 (finding that the declarant’s statements to police about 
the location and identity of an active shooter were not testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (categorizing statements on a 9-1-1 call “to enable police assistance” as 
nontestimonial). 
 80. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 81. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 82. Id. at 651 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305). 
 83. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311. 
 84. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 651 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305). 
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truth of a lab report based on knowledge and experience. Bullcoming 
clarified the Melendez-Diaz requirement by asserting that if laboratory 
results are introduced, the prosecution must also allow confrontation 
of “the analyst who made the certification” unless the analyst is 
unavailable and there was an opportunity to cross-examine at an 
earlier point.85 
Clark raised the question of whether the introduction of witness 
statements made to non-law enforcement personnel could violate a 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause right, and answered in the 
affirmative.86 Clark involved statements made by a three-year-old to 
his preschool teachers regarding the child’s potential abuser.87 The 
Court held that the statements were not made for the primary purpose 
of creating evidence for trial, and were therefore not testimonial.88 In 
doing so, the Court distinguished statements made to police from those 
made to others. Although statements made to non-law enforcement 
personnel are “significantly less likely to be testimonial than 
statements given to law enforcement officers,” their introduction could 
still violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right if the declarant’s 
primary purpose was to create evidence for criminal prosecution.89 
III.  INTRODUCING CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE AFTER OHIO V. CLARK 
Because Clark extends Confrontation Clause protection to 
statements made to non-law enforcement persons, such as members of 
the intelligence community, the introduction of certain types of 
classified evidence must be reevaluated. This Part looks at whether the 
introduction of classified information obtained by intelligence agencies 
may run afoul of the Crawford/Clark requirements. It first surveys 
various intelligence-information collection scenarios and how the 
method of collection may impact the use of evidence at trial. It then 
examines the primary-purpose requirement of Crawford. The Part 
argues that it is unlikely, under most scenarios, that introducing 
intelligence-derived evidence will violate the Confrontation Clause 
because it would be rare for a declarant—in intelligence-collection 
circumstances—to have made statements with the “primary purpose” 
of creating evidence for prosecution. 
 
 85. Id. at 652. 
 86. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).  
 87. Id. at 2178. 
 88. Id. at 2181–82. 
 89. Id.  
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A. Collection of Classified Evidence 
The Crawford/Clark line of cases is concerned with statements 
that are intentionally given by witnesses with the primary purpose of 
creating evidence for criminal prosecution.90 Because the vast majority 
of intelligence-collected statements, especially those in the signals-
intelligence realm, are not intentionally provided by the declarant to 
law enforcement or an intelligence agency, Crawford/Clark restrictions 
likely do not apply. 
Intelligence information is used to provide our elected and 
military leaders with data that shape their decisions and actions in areas 
as diverse as foreign policy, counterterrorism, military maneuvering, 
and nuclear non-proliferation.91 The United States has a number of 
ways to collect intelligence, including human intelligence (HUMINT), 
signals intelligence (SIGINT), open-source intelligence, imagery and 
geospatial intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence.92 
“SIGINT is intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems . . . 
such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems.”93 
Although each type of intelligence has different uses, SIGINT provides 
the greatest share of information that makes it into the President’s 
Daily Brief (which signifies the importance of the information).94 
HUMINT, as the name suggests, refers to “the collection of 
information from human sources.”95 
 
 90. See supra Part II.  
 91. For an excellent overview of intelligence collection and analysis, various uses of 
intelligence-derived information, and the U.S. intelligence community, see generally JEFFREY T. 
RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (7th ed. 2016). 
 92. See id. at 2–3 (describing ways the United States collects intelligence). 
 93. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, Signals Intelligence (May 3, 2016), https://www.nsa.gov/what-we-
do/signals-intelligence [https://perma.cc/3RSZ-5T94]. 
 94. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine 
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companie
s-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?hpid=
z1 [https://perma.cc/4URN-SEYA] (stating that the PRISM program, which collected internet 
SIGINT, accounted for nearly 1500 items in the Presidential Daily Brief in 2012); Lauren Harper, 
National Security Agency Has Pushed to “Rethink and Reapply” Its Treatment of the Fourth 
Amendment Since Before 9/11, UNREDACTED (June 10, 2013), https://nsarchive.wordpress.
com/2013/06/10/national-security-agency-has-pushed-to-rethink-and-reapply-its-treatment-of-
the-fourth-amendment-since-before-911 [https://perma.cc/9EGA-PM2N] (“[B]y January 2001, 
60% of the Presidential Daily Briefings were based upon SIGINT, a percentage that has surely 
increased over the last decade.”). 
 95. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Intelligence Branch, https://www.fbi.gov/
about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch [https://perma.cc/TMQ8-FMW2]. For a short 
primer on all types of intelligence, see id. 
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B. Primary-Purpose Test 
As a threshold matter, the introduction of SIGINT- and 
HUMINT-collected statements could pose a Confrontation Clause 
issue because the declarant is unlikely to be produced for cross-
examination either before or during trial. This is the case because 
either the declarant does not know that her communications are being 
intercepted, or the declarant is working with U.S. intelligence officials 
to uncover information about our allies or adversaries. In either case, 
making the declarant available for trial, if even possible, would reveal 
the “sources and methods” by which the U.S. intelligence apparatus 
goes about its work.96 Under the Crawford/Clark doctrine though, the 
court looks beyond the availability of the declarant for cross-
examination, and instead looks to the declarant’s purpose for making 
the statement.97 For this reason, it is unlikely that most intelligence 
gathered through SIGINT or HUMINT means would trigger a 
requirement that the government produce the declarant. There is, 
however, at least one scenario in the HUMINT context wherein the 
failure to do so would violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right—where a source in U.S. custody specifically attempts to 
incriminate another person by providing information to U.S. 
intelligence officers. 
1. Signals Intelligence.  The primary-purpose test requires that the 
declarant give a statement to another person with the intention or 
foresight of creating evidence for use in a prosecution in order to 
trigger the Confrontation Clause.98 This explanation of “testimonial 
statements” may insulate the use of a great deal of SIGINT from the 
Confrontation Clause requirement. Even though statements were 
procured by non-law enforcement personnel, which could trigger 
Confrontation Clause requirements under Clark,99 statements 
 
 96. See Robert M. Clark, The Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods, THE 
INTELLIGENCER, Fall 2016, at 61, 61, http://www.afio.com/publications/CLARK%20Robert
%20The%20Protection%20of%20Intelligence%20Sources%20and%20Methods%20FINAL%
202016Oct15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PKZ-JXGT] (distinguishing between the product of 
intelligence and the sources and methods used to obtain that intelligence, and stating that “[t]he 
highest level of protection is placed on information that might allow someone to determine the 
identity of the source” of intelligence information).  
 97. See supra Part II.  
 98. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 99. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015). 
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procured by SIGINT methods are not generally made with the 
intention or foresight of producing evidence for trial. 
SIGINT methods are designed to collect information without the 
target being aware of the collection.100 The fact that the declarant is 
unaware that his or her statement—for example, one made in an 
intercepted phone call or email—is being recorded or monitored 
strongly suggests that there can be no legitimate argument that the 
statement was made with the “primary purpose” of creating 
information for a later criminal prosecution. 
The lower courts have found this line of argument applicable to 
the use of Title III wiretaps and statements recorded by undercover 
officers or confidential informants (CI). In Brown v. Epps,101 the Fifth 
Circuit relied on dicta from Davis stating that “statements made 
unwittingly to a government informant were ‘clearly 
nontestimonial,’”102 to uphold the introduction of statements recorded 
by a confidential informant at a criminal trial.103 In Brown, police used 
a wire-wearing CI to record statements made by the defendant over 
the phone before a controlled drug buy.104 Similarly, in United States v. 
Udeozor,105 the Fourth Circuit held that police-recorded telephone 
calls were not testimonial because “no reasonable person in [the 
declarant’s] position would have expected his statements to be used 
later at trial. [The declarant] certainly did not expect that his 
statements would be used prosecutorially; in fact, he expected just the 
 
 100. The unknowing nature of the transmission of intelligence information to the U.S. 
government may have changed after the relevation of a number of intelligence programs by 
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. See, e.g., Shane Harris, CIA’s Ex-No. 2 
Says ISIS ‘Learned from Snowden,’ DAILY BEAST (May 6, 2015, 4:24 PM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/06/cia-s-ex-no-2-says-isis-learned-from-snowden.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ZLU-3KSU] (“U.S. intelligence officials have long argued that Snowden’s 
disclosures provided valuable insights to terrorist groups and nation-state adversaries, including 
China and Russia, about how the U.S. monitors communications around the world.”); Jason 
Leopold, Official Reports on the Damage Caused by Edward Snowden’s Leaks Are Totally 
Redacted, VICE NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/official-reports-on-
the-damage-caused-by-edward-snowdens-leaks-are-totally-redacted [https://perma.cc/V2UN-
KWRD] (“As the Director of National Intelligence has stated, terrorists and other adversaries of 
this country are going to school on US intelligence sources methods and trade craft, and the 
insights that they are gaining are making our job much, much harder . . . .”). 
 101. Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 102. Id. at 287 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006)). 
 103. Id. at 288. 
 104. Id. at 283–84. 
 105. United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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opposite.”106 In Udeozor, unlike in Brown, the prosecution introduced 
a victim’s telephone conversation with a third-party declarant.107 All 
circuit courts that have addressed the issue have found that statements 
recorded without the declarant’s knowledge of the recording were not 
testimonial.108 Clark’s assertion that statements made to non-law 
enforcement personnel could be testimonial has not been read to 
change this calculus. 
The wiretap and CI cases suggest that the police’s intention with 
regard to recording statements is immaterial to establish a violation of 
the Confrontation Clause’s primary-purpose test. In both cases, law 
enforcement intended to create evidence for later prosecution. In 
Udeozor, the court stated that the intentions of police are only relevant 
if a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have expected 
the statements to be used in a later prosecution.109 Because emails and 
telephone calls intercepted by intelligence agencies could not be 
intended or expected by a reasonable declarant to be used in a later 
criminal prosecution, it is unlikely that such evidence would run afoul 
of the Crawford/Clark Confrontation Clause requirements. The fact 
that intelligence agencies are intercepting communications is intended 
to be secret, much like a wiretap in the domestic-surveillance 
context.110 If the declarant—for example, a terrorist based outside of 
the United States—does not know that her communications are being 
intercepted, it is unlikely that she intends her statements to be used in 
a later prosecution. It would be implausible for such a speaker to have 
the “primary purpose” of creating evidence for prosecution if she is 
unaware the statements are being recorded. Therefore, after Clark, 
 
 106. Id. at 269.  
 107. Id. at 266–67. 
 108. Brown, 686 F.3d at 287–88 (“[S]tatements unknowingly made to an undercover 
officer . . . are not testimonial . . . . Many other Circuits have come to the same conclusion, and 
none disagree.” (citing United States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 956 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 778 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2008); Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 269–70; 
United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hendricks, 
395 F.3d 173, 182–84 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
 109. Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 270. 
 110. Intelligence-agency leaders claimed that Edward Snowden’s exposure of the National 
Security Agency’s SIGINT collection programs did significant damage to U.S. national security 
precisely because after the leaks intelligence targets knew the methods NSA could use to intercept 
their communications. James Gordon Meek, Luis Martinez & Alexander Mallin, Intel Heads: 
Edward Snowden Did ‘Profound Damage’ to U.S. Security, ABC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/intel-heads-edward-snowden-profound-damage-us-security/story
?id=22285388 [https://perma.cc/V774-YHHC]. 
LETTENEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2016  11:40 AM 
16 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 66:1 
even though these statements are made outside a courtroom to non-
law enforcement personnel, their use would not violate a defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause right. 
2. Human Intelligence.  The introduction of HUMINT-collected 
statements is more likely to violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right than SIGINT, but the likelihood remains low. HUMINT comes 
in many forms, including interviews with a friendly source, or 
interrogation of a hostile detainee.111 HUMINT may be the only way 
of getting access to certain information held by an intelligence target, 
and therefore can be of enormous value to the United States,112 both 
for its intelligence value, and for its prosecutorial value. Studies in 1994 
found that HUMINT made a critical contribution to 204 of 376 specific 
intelligence issues.113 
HUMINT could pose Confrontation Clause challenges that are 
unlikely to be present with SIGINT. In contrast with SIGINT, 
HUMINT sources generally know that they are making statements to 
U.S. government personnel. Sources of HUMINT provide information 
to the U.S. for any number of reasons, including money, ideology, 
coercion, and ego.114 Courts, in determining whether a HUMINT 
source provided testimonial statements, would look not at their overall 
motivation, but their reason for giving that particular statement. 
The strictures of CIPA could prevent the court from determining 
the declarant’s primary purpose for making a statement. Under CIPA, 
the government can withhold the declarant’s identity and merely 
provide a summary of the information obtained from the source.115 
Though the anonymity of the declarant does not pose a Confrontation 
Clause problem by itself,116 when combined with the government’s 
ability to create a factual summary of the information in the 
statements, a defendant may plausibly raise a claim that the statements 
were intended by the declarant to be used in a criminal prosecution. A 
 
 111. RICHELSON, supra note 91, at 2.  
 112. Id. at 319.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Randy Burkett, An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to 
RASCALS, 57 STUD. INTELLIGENCE, Mar. 2013, at 7, 7 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-
the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-57-no.-1-a/vol.-57-no.-1-a-pdfs/
Burkett-MICE%20to%20RASCALS.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVM4-Z2UV]. 
 115. See supra Part I.  
 116. See Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that an “unidentified 
[declarant’s] recorded statements were not testimonial, and therefore their admission did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause”). 
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reviewing court would have difficulty determining what the source’s 
“primary motivation” was because the court would not have access to 
information about the source, or the method that the government used 
to elicit the statement. 
One could imagine a scenario wherein the perpetrator of a failed 
terrorist attack is arrested and brought to trial in a federal court.117 The 
intelligence community, in its effort to stop further attacks, detains and 
interrogates the defendant’s co-conspirator overseas. The detainee, 
angry with his associate’s failure, gives interrogators information he 
intends to be used to convict the failed terrorist. Such a situation would 
produce, under Crawford/Clark, a statement made to a U.S. 
intelligence official (who is not a law enforcement officer) with the 
primary purpose of providing evidence for trial. Before Clark was 
decided, it was unclear whether the statements would violate the Sixth 
Amendment. However, after Clark, these statements would be 
deemed testimonial even though they were not made to a law 
enforcement officer. If the government were able to conceal both the 
identity of the source and provide the court with a CIPA-sanctioned 
summary of the facts gleaned from the interrogation, there would be a 
surreptitious violation of the Confrontation Clause upon introduction 
of the evidence. Thus, although the introduction of SIGINT evidence 
is unlikely to ever violate the Sixth Amendment, it is possible, in a 
particular scenario, that HUMINT evidence would violate a 
defendant’s constitutional right. 
In the vast majority of cases, declarant statements would be 
allowed without violating the Confrontation Clause. However, as 
discussed above, there are some situations wherein HUMINT-derived 
statements could present Confrontation Clause issues after the Court’s 
decision in Clark, because although the statements were made to non-
law enforcement personnel, they were made with the intention of being 
used for later prosecution.118 
CONCLUSION 
Changes to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
doctrine in the wake of the Court’s decision in Crawford have 
drastically changed the analysis when determining whether an out-of-
 
 117. This scenario is based loosely on facts from United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th 
Cir. 2004).  
 118. See Burkett, supra note 114, at 7 (explaining the motivations for becoming an intelligence 
source).  
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court hearsay statement can be introduced. Subsequent cases, 
including Clark, provide clarification for litigants. Clark’s 
acknowledgement that statements made to non-law enforcement 
personnel can be testimonial suggests that prosecutors seeking to use 
classified intelligence information should be aware of the challenges 
presented by the Confrontation Clause. Although Confrontation 
Clause issues could plausibly arise in some cases, nearly all 
prosecutions using evidence from SIGINT, and most using HUMINT, 
would avoid any Sixth Amendment problems. 
 
